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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
The issue in Arnold v. Benjamin Booth Company1 was
whether the respondent employee's testimony alone, unsup-
ported by medical evidence, was sufficient to support the
commission's finding of a causal connection between the em-
ployee's disability and an accident which aggravated a pre-
existing injury. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that
it was sufficient, relying primarily on its 1968 decision in
Mize v. Sangamo Electric Co.
2
In May, 1969, the employee had suffered an injury in the
course of employment but made no claim for workmen's com-
pensation; he later testified that after the injury he had
continually had trouble with his back and had complained
about it frequently. In October of 1969 he was discharged for
poor attendance, but was rehired roughly three weeks before
the accident in question and continued to complain about his
back until the accident. On June 3, 1970, he was cleaning
floors when an engineer with the company asked him to help
move a desk. The employee testified that he protested that
he was having back pains and could do no lifting, but that
his complaints were ignored. He stated that when he lifted
the desk some two inches off the floor he "felt something
pull" in his back, and afterwards informed the engineer of
the injury and at lunch time went home to get something
for it.
The employee had admitted slipping and falling on his
back in his own yard on May 29, 1970, and the engineer had
1. 257 S.C. 337, 185 S.E.2d 830 (1971).
2. 251 S.C. 250, 161 S.E.2d 846 (1968). The Court in Arnold at 257 S.C.
339, 185 S.E.2d 832, stated:
Circumstantial evidence and lay testimony can be sufficient
to support a finding of causal connection in a Workmen's Com-
pensation case. Such evidence need not reach such a degree of
certainty as to exclude every reasonable or possible conclusion
other than that reached by the Commission. It is sufficient if the
facts and circumstances proved give rise to a reasonable infer-
ence that there was a causal connection between the disability
and the prior injury. Whether the absence of medical testimony is
conclusive on the question of causation depends upon the par-
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testified for the appellants that the employee had made no
protests about moving the desk and had only said afterwards
that he was going home to get some pills for his back. Never-
theless, the supreme court affirmed the circuit court's decision
upholding the commission's award of temporary total dis-
ability, invoking the principle that the commission is the fact-
finding body and that questions of law for the court to decide
are presented only where the evidence gives rise to but one
reasonable inference.
3
The Court noted its prior decisions holding that a com-
pensable injury occurs when a previously existing disease or
condition is aggravated by an injury arising out of or in the
course of employment, 4 and relied on its decision in Mize v.
Sangamo.8 It pointed out that Arnold's injury was not such
as would involve testimony of medical experts alone and con-
cern areas of science or specialization of which laymen could
have no knowledge ;O it also distinguished the situation in this
case from others involving medical testimony.
7
Evans v. Carolina Shipping Company,8 involving the Fed-
eral Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, 9
was an appeal from a third party claim which originated from
an action brought by an injured longshoremen against the
shipowner whose ship he was unloading.
Norris Evans, the longshoreman, was an employee of
Carolina Shipping Co., the stevedoring company unloading
the ship owned by Overseas Maritime, Inc. Evans was injured
3. Polk v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 250 S.C. 468, 158 S.E.2d 765
(1968).
4. Gordon v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 228 S.C. 67, 88 S.E.2d 844
(1955) ; Glover v. Columbia Hospital, 236 S.C. 410, 114 S.E.2d 565 (1960).
5. 251 S.C. 250, 161 S.E.2d 846 (1968).
6. 250 S.C. 468, 158 S.E.2d 765 (1968).
7. At 257 S.C. 342, 185 S.E.2d 832, the court said:
This not a case where there was medical evidence presented
but it failed to meet the "most probably" test, Cross v. Concrete
Materials, 236 S.C. 440, 114 S.E.2d 828; nor a case where medical
testimony negated the possibility of the disability being caused
by the accident in question, Dennis v. Williams Furniture Corp.,
243 S.C. 53, 132 S.E2d 1; nor a case where there is a conflict
between lay and expert testimony, Rollins v. Wunda Weve Car-
pet Co., 255 S.C. 1, 177 S.E.2d 5 (emphasis added).
8. 451 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1971).
9. 33 U.S.C. §901 et seq.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SURVEYED
when a bale of cotton piece goods fell back into the hatch of
the ship while it was being unloaded; Carolina Shipping Co.
paid him $25,663.28 in compensation under the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' 0 Evans then
brought suit against Overseas Maritime, which settled with
the injured longshoreman for the sum of $137,500, plus the
assumption by Overseas of payment of the subrogation claim
of Carolina Shipping, in the event that it became due. Overseas
Maritime then brought an action for indemnification 1 against
Carolina Shipping, who counterclaimed for reimbursement
of its lien for medical and compensation payments. 12 The U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charles-
ton, in an action tried without a jury, found for the ship-
owner,"3 dismissing Carolina's counterclaim.
The District Court found that Carolina Shipping had
breached its implied warranty to unload in a safe and work-
manlike manner and granted the shipowner the sum of
$137,500, plus the extinguishment of Carolina's subrogation
lien. The court pointed out that under the clear terms of the
release the settlement contemplated was for a gross figure of
$163,163.28, which amount included as consideration the as-
umption by Overseas of the compensation lien of Carolina in
the event that Carolina should make a claim against Evans
10. 33 U.S.C. §914 (a) provides:
Compensation under this chapter shall be paid periodically,
promptly, and directly to the person entitled, thereto, without an
award, except where liability to pay compensation is contro-
verted by the employer.
11. Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
a third party sued by an injured employee is entitled to indemnity from the
employer where the injury occurs as a result of a breach by the employer of
a duty to the third party which necessarily inheres in the contractual obligation
assumed by the employer in his contract with the third party. Ryan Stevedoring
Corporation v. Pan-American Steamship Corporation, 350 U.S. 124 (1956);
See generally Amerocean Steamship Company v. Copp, 245 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.
1957), Rich v. United States, 177 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1949), Weinstock, The
Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor
Workers, 103 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 321 (1954).
12. For a discussion of employers' liens of this nature under the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, see Mitchell v. The
Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3rd Cir. 1943); see generally, International Terminal Op-
erating Co. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 272 F.2d 15 (2nd Cir. 1959), Petition
of Sheffield Tankers Corporation, 222 F. Supp. 441, (N.D. Cal. 1963), Potomac
Electric Power Company v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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for the lien; thus the parties intended that the compensation
lien of Carolina Shipping was to be extinguished if Overseas
prevailed in its action for indemnification against Carolina,
but that if Carolina had prevailed, then Overseas would have
been obligated under the release to pay Carolina $25,663.28,
the full amount of its lien.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
It found the evidence sufficient to support the findings of
the district court that Carolina had breached its implied war-
ranty to unload the ship in a safe, workmanlike manner.
The Court of Appeals also approved of the district court's
extinguishment of Carolina's subrogation lien, giving several
factors for its decision. Carolina had agreed that the payment
to Evans "net" was reasonable and just, at a time when it was
thought that Overseas would contribute half of the sum paid
to Evans without reimbursement. Also, the counsel for Caro-
lina Shipping had admitted that payment to Evans of
$137,500 plus an additional $25,663.28 for his compensation
benefits would not be excessive, considering Evans' age and
earning capacity and the severity of his injuries. Lastly, the
court emphasized the fact that the shipowner's agreement
with the injured longshoreman to reimburse Carolina Ship-
ping was indistinguishable from methods of settlement held
to be permissible in the 1st circuit in Jarka Corp. of New
England v. United States Lines Co.14
The most interesting case dealt with in this survey period
was Sexton v. Freeman Gas Company,'6 involving the question
of whether Carroll Sexton's death at a train crossing while
returning to his office after a trip to the barbershop, occurred
within the course of employment.' 6 Sexton's widow's claim for
benefits was granted by the hearing commissioner, then de-
nied in a split decision by the full commission, but reinstated
by the circuit court. On appeal the issue was whether the full
commission's finding that the accident did not occur within
the course of employment was supported by the evidence. The
South Carolina Supreme Court held that Sexton's death did
occur within the course of employment.
14. 387 F.2d 436, 438 (ist Cir. 1967).
15. 258 S.C. 15, 187 S.E.2d 128 (1972).
16. S.C. CODa ANN. §72-401 (1962) provides in part:
Injury shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment ....
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Sexton was the salaried manager and service and instal-
lation mechanic of the gas company's Chesnee office, which
included two other employees who were paid on an hourly
scale. Sexton's schedule was irregular and undefined-he was
free to structure his time and activities in any fashion he
chose, consistent with the successful management of the gas
company's business. Occasionally he had to respond to emer-
gency calls at night or on weekends. He was always "on call,"
whether at home, in the office, or in the company truck, which
was equipped with a two-way radio and which he was free
to use for travel from home to work.
On the afternoon of his death Sexton had left the office
in the truck to get a haircut, telling the secretary that he
would return as soon as possible. On leaving the barbershop
he proceeded directly to the outskirts of town to the scene of
a brushfire which had previously threatened a home contain-
ing one of the gas company's cylinders. After rendering some
few minutes assistance in fighting the fire, he left on the
shortest route back to the office. The owner of the home had
testified that the fire was at one time within some seventy-
five to one-hundred feet of his house. Also, there was evi-
dence that Sexton had often checked other such fires to deter-
mine the safety of the company's tanks. Nevertheless, the
commission found that his activity at the fire was not in the
interests of the employer.
The fluid pattern of activity which characterized Sexton's
employment was the important factor in this case. Conceding
the conclusiveness of the commission's finding that Sexton's
activity at the brushfire was not in the interests of his em-
ployer, the supreme court noted that such finding nonetheless
was not determinative (as the commission had apparently
assumed) of the issue of the scope of employment at the time
of the accident. The court noted that at any time while in the
truck he might have been called via radio to attend to com-
pany business, and held that, "under the circumstances which
have been related, when he left (the brushfire) and began
traveling the shortest route back to the office, he resumed
the course of his employment." 17
Because of the unusual fact situation presented, the court
was at a loss for direct authority, but reasoned,
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While we have found no case involving a similar employer-
employee relationship, the principles involved in dealing with certain
analogous situations point to the conclusion we have reached. For
example, we have recognized that there are exceptions to the general
rule of noncompensability for injuries sustained during the basic trip to
and from work. These exceptions include cases where, "in going to and
returning from work, the means of transportation is provided by the
employer, or the time thus consumed is paid for or included in the
wages," or where "the employee, on his way to or from his work is
still charged with some duty or task in connection with his employ-
ment." Gallman v. Springs Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 263, 22 S.E2d 715, 718
(1942). Similar exceptions generally obtain when the employee's travel
to and from the premises occurs at lunchtime. 1 A. Larson, Law of
Workmen's Compensation, Sec. 15.52 (1968).18
Pointing to the precept that the commission is the fact-
finder and is not to be reversed on such issues of fact unless
the evidence leads to but one reasonable inference, Justice
Littlejohn in his dissenting opinion felt that the claimant had
failed to meet the burden of proof that the accident had oc-
curred within the course of employment. Justice Littlejohn
argued that whereas the Commission had succinctly outlined
the factual basis of its findings, neither the circuit judge nor
the majority opinion showed evidence sufficient to justify
their conclusions. Justice Littlejohn also felt that both the
majority opinion and the respondent's counsel had misstated
the question involved.10
WILLIAM T. CLARKE
18. Id. Compare the court's holding with cases cited in 99 C.J.S. Work-
men's Compensation §222 (c) (1958). See especially, Clegg v. Motor Finance
Corporation, 28 A.2d 533, 20 N.J. Misc. 437 (1942). It is the opinion of the
writer that the Sexton case will in the future be limited to its facts.
19. The respondent maintained that the issue was whether the employee
was entitled to application of the principle of law that, where an employee is
found dead at a place and time where his employment reasonably requires him
to be, there is a presumption of fact that his death arose out of and in the
course of employment, citing Floyd v. Greene Plumbing and Heating Company,
255 S.C. 352, 179 S.E.2d 28 (1971), Halpern v. De Jay Stores, 236 S.C. 587,
115 S.E.2d 297 (1960), Owens v. Ocean Forest Club, 196 S.C. 97, 12 S.E2d
839 (1939), Jake v. Jones, 240 S.C. 574, 126, S.E.2d 721 (1962), Steed v.
Mt. Pleasant Seafood Co., 236 S.C. 253, 113 S.E.2d 827 (1960).
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